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 SHARING THE “FAME” OF QUALITY CERTIFICATION: 
QUALITY SUPPLY CHAIN EFFECTS EVIDENCE 
 
Marc-Arthur Diaye, Nathalie Greenan, Sanja Pekovic 
 
ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence for whether the hierarchical 
position (determined by firm’s quality strength) of different types of quality supply chain 
categories implies the same hierarchy in terms of economic gains. Using the French survey 
on Organisational Change and Computerisation (COI-TIC), we distinguish four types of 
quality supply chain categories that help us to empirically construct a relationship between 
firms and their suppliers (quality certified/non quality certified). Our findings, from a two-
regime switching model, reveal that there is a positive correlation between the hierarchical 
positions of the quality supply chain categories and the impact on firm performance. 
Keywords: quality certification, quality standards, supply chain, firm performance, COI-TIC survey. 
Classification JEL : D24, L14, L15 
 
  
Partager la « réputation » de la certification qualité :  
l’identification d’un effet de chaîne d’approvisionnement1 
Résumé 
L'objectif de cet article est d’identifier empiriquement si l’importance accordée par 
l’entreprise à la gestion de la qualité dans sa production et sa chaîne d’approvisionnement 
est corrélée avec l’importance des gains qu’elle en retire. À partir de l’enquête Changements 
Organisationnels et Informatisation (COI-TIC), on distingue quatre types de chaînes 
d'approvisionnement selon la place faite à la gestion de la qualité, mesurée par le recours 
aux standards et procédures de qualité, dans les relations entre les entreprises et leurs 
fournisseurs. S’appuyant sur l’estimation d’un modèle à changement de régime, nos résultats 
montrent qu'il existe bien une corrélation positive entre la position hiérarchique de 
l’entreprise dans sa chaîne d’approvisionnement, telle que définie par les enjeux de gestion 
de la qualité, et sa performance économique. 
Mots-clefs : certification qualité, standards de qualité, chaîne d’approvisionnement, performance 
des entreprises, enquête COI-TIC. 
 
                                              
1 Une version révisée de cet article a été publié dans l’International Journal of Production Research : Diaye M.-A., 
Greenan N. et Pekovic S., 2014, « Sharing the ‘fame’ of ISO standard adoption: quality supply chain effects evidence », 
International Journal of Production Research, DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2014.907512. 
  
INTRODUCTION2 
The lack of well-established quality management system (QMS) all along the supply chain 
increases the risks of supply chain disruption, which may harm a firm’s operations, business 
performance and public image (Hendricks and Singhal, 2005a). Nevertheless, establishing 
quality within supply chains requires substantial resources and long-term commitments from 
all parties involved, which can negatively affect a firm’s competitiveness (e.g. Zu and 
Kaynak, 2012). However, since a firm’s final product is only as good as its inputs, final 
product quality is also dependent on the quality of supplied inputs (e.g. Forker et al., 1997; 
Tan et al., 1999; Romano and Vinelli, 2001; Romano, 2002; Wu et al., 2011). Actually, 
Forker et al. (1997) argue that improvements in quality depend greatly on the implementation 
and coordination of quality management activities upstream in suppliers’ operations. 
Consequently, the effectiveness of firm performance does not only depend on firm’s quality 
but may also vary according to the characteristics of the quality relationship between the firm 
and its suppliers (Cusumano and Takeshi, 1991; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). 
While a growing body of literature analyses the impact of quality standards on firm 
performance, scholars have provided less empirical evidence on whether the quality level of 
upstream and downstream players in the supply chain also counts for individual firm 
corporate performance (Romano, 2002). Therefore, the question we address in this paper is 
whether the impact of different types of supply chains (in term of quality sensitivity) on firm 
performance is the same according to the type of supply chain a firm belongs to. Actually, we 
will examine the direct link between the level of quality established within supply chain and 
firm corporate performance measured by profit per employee. 
Due to data limitation, we are only able to analyse the upstream side of supply chain 
sensitivity towards quality standards. Based on the firm’s and supplier’s characteristics 
related to quality certification, we create four possible types of quality generated supply 
chains. The first type of quality supply chain that we call direct complete quality supply 
chain includes firms that are quality certified and whose suppliers follow quality standards or 
quality control procedures. The second type, direct non complete quality supply chain, 
presents those firms that are quality certified, although their suppliers are not. The third type, 
indirect quality supply chain, includes firms that are not quality certified, but their suppliers 
follow quality standards or quality control procedures. The fourth type, non quality supply 
chain, includes firms that are not quality certified, and their suppliers also lack quality 
certification. According to the strength of the quality established in the firm’s supply chain 
network, we can classify our four categories as follows: the direct complete quality supply 
chain is at the top of the classification, followed by the direct non complete quality supply 
chain, then the indirect quality supply chain and finally the non quality supply chain. We will 
evaluate empirically whether the hierarchical positioning in term of quality signal of the four 
quality supply chain categories implies the same hierarchy in terms of economic gains. This 
question is important because a positive answer means that quality standards, like the ISO 
certification, could be considered as club goods, which are a subtype of public goods that are 
excludable but non rivalrous, leading to some fundamental open questions such as whether 
                                              
2 A revised version of this paper has been published in the International Journal of Production Research : Diaye M.-A., 
Greenan N. and Pekovic S., 2014, « Sharing the ‘fame’ of ISO standard adoption: quality supply chain effects 
evidence », International Journal of Production Research, DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2014.907512. 
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the number of quality certified firms is Pareto optimal. Indeed, given the existence of 
externalities, it may be the case that the number of firms that are quality certified is lower 
than the Pareto optimal number of quality certified firms.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 1 reviews the literature on quality 
standards and supply chain management; section 2 develops the main hypotheses; section 3 
presents the data sets and introduces our econometric analysis and section 4 presents the 
results discussion. Finally, we conclude with a discussion on managerial implications and 
future directions for research. 
1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1. The impact of quality standards on firm performance 
The relationship between quality standards and firm performance has received increased 
attention over the last few years (see e.g. Grolleau et al. [2012] for comprehensive reviews). 
However, no consensus has emerged so far. The literature presents conflicting arguments 
concerning the impact of quality standards on firm corporate performance. One set of 
arguments supports a positive relationship between quality standards and firm performance, 
implying that quality standards are likely to increase firms’ competitiveness by lowering 
defect rates, reducing the cost of quality, and increasing productivity, on-time delivery and 
customer satisfaction (Terziovski et al., 2003; Sharma, 2005; Corbett et al., 2005; Terlaak 
and King, 2006; Benner and Veloso, 2008; Lo et al., 2008; Levine and Toffel, 2009). The 
opposing set of arguments claims that quality standards implementation is costly and is likely 
to decrease firms’ competitiveness (Lima et al., 2000; Martinez-Costa and Martinez-Lorente, 
2003; McGuire and Dilts, 2007; Martínez-Costa et al., 2009). In turn, recent research by 
Grolleau et al. (2012) provides findings that the inconsistency in results could be due to the 
definition of firm performance or misspecification of models. Moreover, the authors provide 
some positive evidence about the relationship between quality and firm performance, but 
stress that the complementarity between quality and environmental standards improves this 
relationship better. 
1.2. Quality management from the supply chain perspective 
In recent years, firms have begun to look beyond their own boundaries to meet the challenge 
of moving from internal efficiency to supply chain efficiency (Olhager and Selldin, 2002), 
which is defined as a strategic collaboration or partnership between firms to leverage 
strategic position and to improve operating efficiency. Moreover, due to the increasing 
importance of quality management, firms have also been obliged to establish cooperative 
relationships with suppliers especially in the area of quality management (e.g. Romano, 
2002; Kaynak, 2003; Zu and Kaynak, 2012). Forster (2008) defines quality supply chain as 
“a systems-based approach to performance improvement that leverages opportunities created 
by upstream and downstream linkages with customers”. Moreover, several researchers argue 
that there is a positive correlation between quality management and supply chain 
management (Flynn and Flynn, 2005; Foster and Ogden, 2008; Vanichchinchai and Igel, 
2010) and they are even complementary with respect to firm performance (e.g. Tan et al., 
1998; Zu and Kaynak, 2012). Similarly, the integration of quality management into the 
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supply chain focuses on cooperative relationships between members of the supply chain, 
permitting the achievement of cumulative competitive capabilities (Flynn and Flynn, 2005). 
However, integrating quality management and supply chain management is not easy to 
implement due to the structural and cultural differences of the firms concerned (e.g. Pagell 
2004; Foster and Ogden, 2008). Robinson and Malhotra (2005) stress that the 
implementation of quality management in the supply chain needs to be chain-centered rather 
than firm-centered, as it typically is in the intra-organisational perspective of traditional 
quality management.  
2. HYPOTHESES 
The implementation of quality standards inside the firm principally improves individual 
internal processes (Robinson and Malhotra, 2005; Zu and Kaynak, 2012). However, the 
quality level delivered to the final customer is the result of the quality management practices 
of each member of the supply chain (Forker et al., 1997; Tan et al., 1999; Romano and 
Vinelli, 2001; Romano, 2002; Wu et al., 2011). Therefore, having a supplier that has 
problems related to quality can cause various problems to the firm (Sodhi and Lee, 2007). In 
this sense, Das (2011) argues that the avoidance of costs related to product recall arising from 
quality failure is possible only by integrating quality management systems all along the 
supply chain network. In other words, as demonstrated by Kaynak (2003), the role of 
supplier quality management in effective firm quality management lies in its direct 
relationships with product/service design and process management. Moreover, establishing 
quality relationship between firm and supplier improves coordination and configuration of 
the business process between the two parties, which should increase customer satisfaction 
and firm performance (Forker et al., 1997).  
Several research projects have underlined the importance of quality management 
integration internally within each supply chain member. For instance, working on survey 
data from a cross-industry sample of quality directors and vice presidents in US firms, Tan 
et al. (1998) show that quality management and supply base management techniques and 
tools must be implemented conjointly to achieve superior financial and business 
performance. Romano (2002) finds that supply chain sensitivity to quality improves 
punctuality, delivery speed and volume flexibility in Italian certified manufacturing firms. 
Using data on Taiwanese firms, Kuei et al. (2001) show that firms with higher supply chain 
quality management tend to perform better on cost savings than those with low quality 
systems. Investigating factors that influence supply chain quality management, Lin et al. 
(2005) use data from Taiwan and Hong Kong to show that Quality Management (QM) 
practices are significantly correlated with the supplier participation strategy, and this 
influences tangible business results and customer satisfaction levels. Working on a sample 
of 565 observations, Kannan and Tan (2005) conclude that a commitment to quality and an 
understanding of supply chain dynamics have the greatest effect on performance. In the 
same sense, Kaynak and Hartley (2008) confirm empirically that the implementation of 
QM within each supply chain member’s organisation is a prerequisite for supply chain 
quality that could in turn improve firm business performance. Based on quantitative and 
qualitative investigations of 225 electronics manufacturing firms, Yeung (2008) concludes 
that strategic supply management is essentially a quality management initiative which leads 
to improvements in on-time shipments, reduces operational costs, and creates customer 
satisfaction and better business performance.  
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Therefore, all the studies cited above indicate that being quality certified is a positive signal 
of quality improvement, and having a supplier that is a certified firm amplifies this positive 
signal. In the following, we are going to distinguish between four types of supply chains: 
direct complete quality supply chains include companies that have quality certification, and 
their (largest) suppliers follow quality standards or quality control procedures; direct non 
complete quality supply chains contain firms that are quality certified, but their suppliers are 
not; indirect quality supply chains include firms which are not quality certified, but their 
suppliers follow quality standards or quality control procedures; and non quality supply 
chains include firms that are not quality certified, and whose suppliers do not have any 
quality certification. We propose the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a: The performances of the firms belonging to the direct complete quality supply chain are 
higher than those of the direct non complete quality supply chain. 
H1b: The performances of the firms belonging to the direct complete quality supply chain are 
higher than those of the firms belonging to the indirect quality supply chain. 
H1c: The performances of the firms belonging to the direct complete quality supply chain are 
higher than those of the firms belonging to the non quality supply chain. 
 
A certified firm that has a non-certified firm as a supplier reduces the positive signals 
stemming from quality improvement since the mismatch between firm and supplier is found 
to be negatively associated with firm performance (e.g. Hendricks and Singhal, 2005a; 
Hendricks and Singhal, 2005b). However, even if the suppliers are not certified in the direct 
non complete quality supply chain category, the firm’s certification nonetheless permits this 
group to increase quality performance. Even though we have indicated that the empirical 
research on quality standards and firm performance provides conflicting conclusions, there 
are several important arguments supporting a positive relationship between quality standards 
and firm corporate performance. One of the main arguments supporting the positive idea 
could be that quality standards refer to flexible work organisation that entails quality, 
flexibility and economies of scale through systematic organisational learning, elimination of 
waste, maximised utilisation of employees’ skills and initiatives, and improvement of 
managerial competence. Moreover, the premise of the quality management standards is based 
on improving an organisation’s efficiency through high-level coordination of its activities in 
a rationalised system of end-to-end processes, which includes every aspect of firm 
performance (Benner and Tushman, 2002). Firms that adopt quality management practices 
significantly alter work organisation, demanding new attitudes, roles and responsibilities for 
all firm members (Womack et al., 1990). Hence, firms that adopt QM gain competitive 
advantage through provision of superior value to customers, thereby increasing revenues, 
sales and market share, reducing costs and waste through better process efficiency, and 
improving of firms’ quality performance and corporate image (Terlaak and King, 2006). 
Additionally, with regards to an employee-based perspective, QM practices contribute to 
workforce improvement. Working under QM improves employee initiative and flexibility 
through broadening job classifications, creating flexible assignments, decentralising 
workplace organisation, offering training and work in groups, and involving employees in 
decision making (Greenan and Mairesse, 1999; Greenan and Mairesse, 2006; Levine and 
Toffel, 2009).  
On the basis of this reasoning, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
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H2a: The performances of the firms belonging to the direct non complete quality supply 
chain are higher than those of the firms belonging to the indirect quality supply chain. 
H2b: The performances of the firms belonging to the direct non complete quality supply 
chain are higher than those of the firms belonging to the non quality supply chain. 
 
We argue that having a certified firm as a supplier, while being non-certified, improves the 
signals regarding quality improvement. Since a quality certified supplier is more likely to 
reduce the risk of quality problems and failure, it would be capable of providing better 
quality to the firm (Kaynak and Hartley, 2008). In this one-way quality relationship, in 
addition to helping a firm compete on speed, suppliers can also provide quality and design 
insights to the firm (Flynn and Flynn, 2005). Similarly, working with quality certified 
suppliers reduces pre-processing cycle time delays for incoming inspection (Heiko, 1990). 
It is worth noting that the quality of the firm’s outputs is always dependent on the quality of 
the inputs obtained from the firm’s supplier. In fact, as argued by Levine (1995), a high 
level of involvement between the firm and its suppliers is an important characteristic of 
many successful businesses because more than half the value of a firm’s product is 
purchased from suppliers. Moreover, suppliers are encouraged to share quality information 
with members of the supply chain network in order to improve overall supply chain 
performance (Kaynak and Hartley, 2008; Wu et al., 2011). Certainly, supplier partnering, 
which involves close cooperation between firms and their suppliers, allows non-certified 
firms to learn about the best quality management practices from their certified supply chain 
partners (Terlaak, 2001). In a same sense, open communication and cooperation between 
firm and supplier creates conditions that could help the firm to reduce the risk of quality 
failure (Zu and Kaynak, 2012). Furthermore, the results of Wu et al. (2011) indicate that a 
firm always benefits from quality information sharing, that reduces its total cost, through 
indirect membership. Additionally, firms choose high quality suppliers to enhance their 
own quality reputations (Delmas and Montiel, 2009) since a customer’s beliefs about a 
firm’s quality could be established upon observing the firm’s decision to form a quality 
partnership with its suppliers (Costa and Vasconcelos, 2010). In this sense, in the case of 
the indirect quality supply chain, although the principal beneficiary of quality certification 
advantages is not directly certified, firms in this group indirectly benefit from quality 
certification advantages through their suppliers, which are certified. We consider this 
relationship as fairly weak in terms of the diffusion of quality improvement information. 
However, since firms that belong to the non quality supply chain category are not quality 
certified and do not have quality certified suppliers, we argue that the quality signal of 
indirect quality supply chain firms is stronger than the quality signal of firms belonging to 
the non quality supply chain. In addition, an empirical study by Pekovic and Galia (2009) 
corroborates this contention. Working on a sample of French manufacturing firms, the 
authors find that non quality certified firms can access indirect quality certification via their 
quality certified suppliers and therefore improve their innovation performance better than 
firms that are non quality certified and also do not have certified suppliers. Consequently, 
we hypothesise: 
 
H3: The performances of the firms belonging to the indirect quality supply chain are higher 
than those of the firms belonging to the non quality supply chain.  
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3. METHODS 
3.1. The database 
The data is extracted from the French Organisational Changes and Computerisation (COI) 
2006 survey3. The COI survey is a matched employer-employee dataset on organisational 
change and computerisation. The survey was developed by researchers and statisticians from 
the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), the Ministry of Labour, 
and the Center for Labour Studies (CEE) and carried out in the field by INSEE. The 
questionnaires were prepared based on collective discussion involving researchers in 
economics, management, sociology, ergonomics and trade unions and management 
representatives. Consequently, the survey is doubly rooted in research issues and in social 
demand. A representative sample of 14,369 private firms with ten employees and more 
located in France from all industries except agriculture, forestry and fishing responded to the 
survey. Each firm filled in a self-administered questionnaire concerning the utilisation of 
information technologies and work organisational practices in 2006, and changes that have 
occurred in those areas since 2003. Firms were also interviewed on the economic goals 
driving the decision to implement organisational changes and the economic context in which 
those decisions were made. In order to obtain information on profit and capital, the COI 
survey was merged with another survey called the Annual Enterprise Survey (EAE). It is an 
annual survey conducted by the French Ministry of Industry and INSEE to collect basic data 
on the structure of surveyed firms such as business activities, size and location. The banking 
sector is not covered by this survey. As a result of these merges, our sample includes 
7,685 firms. 
3.1.1 Dependent Variable 
Drawing on prior research (e.g. Waddock and Graves, 1997), we measure firm performance 
as the logarithm of the firm’s profit by the number of employees. The Annual Enterprise 
Survey (EAE) is used to obtain information on the firm profit. Number of employees is 
obtained from the Organisational Changes and Computerisation (COI) database. 
3.1.2 Independent Variable 
The four categories of quality supply chain were assessed by using two variables from the 
COI survey. First, we use information on whether the firm is registered for quality 
certification like ISO 9001, EAQF, etc., and, on second, whether the firm’s supplier follows 
quality standards or quality control procedure. Based on our four categories of quality supply 
chains, the direct complete quality supply chain, the direct non complete quality supply 
chain, the indirect quality supply chain and the non quality supply chain, we create six 
dummies of quality supply chain categories that will permit us to test our hypotheses. 
                                              
3 More details about the design and scope of this survey are available on www.enquetecoi.net. See also the general 
presentation of the survey and main results in Greenan et al. (2010). Papers using the COI survey are listed at the 
following address: http://scholar.google.fr/citations?user=Ab_WMDcAAAAJ&hl=en. 
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To summarise, we consider the following six models: 
• In Model 1, the dummy variable is 1 if the firm belongs to a direct complete quality 
supply chain and is 0 if the firm belongs to a direct non complete quality supply chain. 
• In Model 2, the dummy variable is 1 if the firm belongs to a direct complete Quality 
supply chain and is 0 if the firm belongs to an indirect quality supply chain. 
• In Model 3, the dummy variable is 1 if the firm belongs to a direct complete quality 
supply chain and is 0 if the firm belongs to a non quality supply chain. 
• In Model 4, the dummy variable is 1 if the firm belongs to a direct non complete 
quality supply chain and is 0 if the firm to an indirect quality supply chain. 
• In Model 5, the dummy variable is 1 if the firm belongs to a direct non complete 
quality supply chain and is 0 if the firm belongs to a non quality supply chain. 
• In Model 6, the dummy variable is 1 if the firm belongs to an indirect quality supply 
chain and is 0 if the firm belongs to a non quality supply chain. 
For instance, when we compare firms in the direct complete quality supply chain category to 
firms in the direct non complete quality supply chain category, y1 is the logarithm of the 
profit per employee for firms in the direct complete quality supply chain category, and y0 is 
the logarithm of the profit per employee for the firms in the direct non complete quality 
supply chain category.  
3.1.3. Controls 
Our analysis includes several firm characteristics to control for sources of firm-level 
heterogeneity. The choice of variables is based on previous analysis of firm performance 
(e.g. Greenan and Mairesse, 2000; Black and Lynch; 2001; Terlaak and King, 2006; Pekovic, 
2010).  
Features of the firm’s strategy. It is argued that the adoption of quality standards is positively 
associated with features of the firm’s strategy such as quality improvement, cost reduction 
and competitive price policy. This is because the adoption of quality practices contributes to 
the improvement of these strategies by work method continuity, reducing non-profit 
activities, improving operations and supporting innovation (Pekovic, 2010). To introduce a 
specific strategy, a firm has to significantly change the way the business is organised. 
Therefore, following Black and Lynch (2001), we argue that changes in organisation strategy 
have been significant determinants of the firm performance. We create three binary variables 
representing quality improvement, cost reduction and competitive price policy that equal 1 if 
the firm considers quality improvement, cost reduction, and competitive price policy as 
important or very important strategies, respectively. 
External market constraints. The literature review confirms that a firm is driven to 
implement quality practices by external pressure (e.g. Terlaak and King, 2006). The belief 
that external pressure enhances a firm performance is widespread and is based on the fact 
that external pressure plays a role in motivating organisational efficiency and growth (e.g. 
Aghion et al., 1999). We include four measures to control for the external market constraints. 
More precisely, we introduce two variables that have a value of 1 if the firm has been 
affected strongly or very strongly by competitive pressure and market uncertainty. 
Additionally, we include two more variables presenting conditions imposed by suppliers and 
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clients that take a value of 1 if the three main suppliers or clients make up 50% of the firm’s 
turnover, respectively.  
Previous experience. We also control for experience with related management standards, 
such as environmental standards. Prior adoption of similar standards can ease the successful 
implementation of quality certification through the utilisation of related information, 
resources and skills. Furthermore, Grolleau et al. (2012) provides empirical evidence that 
environmental practices can increase a firm performance. We include a binary variable coded 
1 if the firm was registered according to one of the following standards, i.e. ISO 14001 
standard, organic labelling, fair trade, and other types of environmental-related standards, in 
2006. Unfortunately, the database does not distinguish between those standards. However, 
since these standards have similar components, it is expected that their impact will be similar. 
Relationship with Clients. The concept of quality practices is based on the need to maintain 
very close links with customers to both identify their needs and receive the feedback 
necessary for the firm to understand to what extent it has succeeded in satisfying those 
requirements and whether to initiate the relevant improvement activities. Moreover, if the 
quality levels of firms are unobservable, from a signalling perspective, quality standards can 
provide information on the general capability of a firm to meet the quality expectations of 
customers and thus make unobservable characteristics more public (Spence, 1973). It is 
expected that good relationships with clients have positive impacts on a firm’s performance 
because improvements in customer satisfaction can decrease the time and effort devoted to 
handling returns, rework, warranties and complaint management while at the same time 
lowering the costs of making future transactions (Anderson and Rust, 1997). We use three 
binary variables as indicators for relationships with clients: using labelling for goods and 
services, delivering or supplying goods or services on a fixed deadline and having an external 
manager for client relations. They take the value 1 if under customer policy firm uses 
labelling for goods and services, contract to assure timeless delivery and has external 
department related to client relations. 
Capital. Firms with more capital are expected to invest in quality standards. Furthermore, 
capital is considered as an important determinant of firm performance (Greenan and 
Mairesse, 2000; e.g. Capon et al., 1990). Therefore, we introduce a continuous variable that 
indicates firm’s capital. 
Size. The majority of empirical studies (e.g. Terlaak and King, 2006) found that the 
probability of the adoption of quality standards increases with a firm’s size. Furthermore, 
size has also been considered as a significant determinant of firm performance (e.g. Waddock 
and Graves, 1997), although the direction of its effect is not consistent (Russo and Fouts, 
1997). Firm size is measured as a logarithm of the number of employees within the firm. 
Sector of Activity. Finally, it is argued that sector characteristics influence the likelihood of a 
firm deciding to implement quality practices. Furthermore, the firm performance effects of 
one sector cannot easily be transferred to other sectors (Godard and Delaney, 2000). To 
control for sectoral differences, we include sectoral dummy variables based on the N36 
sector classification created by the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic 
Studies. More precisely, we introduce 11 dummy variables that equal 1 if the firm’s activity 
is agro-food, consumption goods, cars and equipment, intermediate goods, energy, 
construction, commercial, transport, financial and real-estate activities, services for firms and 
services for individuals. 
The variables used in the estimation, their definitions and data sources are presented in 
Table 1. No strong correlation problem has been detected (Appendix 1). 
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Table 1. Definition of variables 
Variable Definition  Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent variables      
PROFIT** 
Logarithm of Profit per employee 
(Continuous variable) 
1.43 1.32 -1.73 7.67 
Independent variables      
DIRECT COMPLETE 
QUALITY SUPPLY 
CHAIN* 
The firm is registered for ISO 9001, 
EAQF, etc and the supplier follows 
quality standards or quality control 
procedure 
Dummy variable (=1 if firm and 
supplier- yes) 
0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
DIRECT NON COMPLETE 
QUALITY SUPPLY 
CHAIN* 
The firm is registered for ISO 9001, 
EAQF, etc and the supplier does not 
follow quality standards or quality 
control procedure 
Dummy variable (=1 if firm-yes and 
supplier-no) 
0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
INDIRECT QUALITY 
SUPPLY CHAIN* 
The firm is not registered for ISO 9001, 
EAQF, etc and the supplier follows 
quality standards or quality control 
procedure 
Dummy variable (=1 if firm-no and 
supplier-yes) 
0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
NON QUALITY SUPPLY 
CHAIN* 
The firm is not registered for ISO 9001, 
EAQF, etc and the supplier does not 
follow quality standards or quality 
control procedure 
Dummy variable (=1 if firm-no and 
supplier-no) 
0.29 
 
0.45 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
Control variables      
ACTIVITY* 
The main activity of the firm: 11 dummy variables (=1 agro-food; consumption 
goods; cars and equipments; intermediate goods; energy; construction; 
commercial; transport; financial and real-estate activities; services for firms; and 
services for individuals respectively) 
QUALDEP* 
The firm has had quality department 
since 2003. 
Dummy variable (=1 if yes) 
0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
QUALEXT* 
The firm has had external manager for 
quality since 2003. 
Dummy variable (=1 if yes) 
0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
ES* 
Certified with ISO 14001, organic food 
labeling or fair trade  
Dummy variable (=1 if certified in 
2003) 
0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
QUALITY 
IMPROVEMENT* 
Quality strong or very strong  strategic 
importance  
Dummy variable (=1 if yes) 
0.97 0.18 0.00 1.00 
COST REDUCTION* 
Cost reduction strong or very strong 
strategic importance  
Dummy variable (=1 if yes) 
0.85 0.35 0.00 1.00 
COMPETITIVE PRICE* 
Competitive price strong or very strong 
strategic importance  
Dummy variable (=1 if yes) 
0.85 0.35 0.00 1.00 
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COMPETITIVE PRESSURE* 
Since 2003, the firm has been affected 
by strongly or very strongly by 
competitive pressure  
Dummy variable (=1 if yes) 
0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
MARKET UNCERTAINTY*  
Since 2003, the firm has been affected 
by strongly or very strongly by market 
uncertainty  
Dummy variable (=1 if yes) 
0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 
CLIENTS CONDITIONED* 
Three main clients make up 50% of the 
firm’s turnover 
Dummy variable (=1 if yes) 
0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
SUPPLIERS 
CONDITIONED* 
Three main suppliers make up 50% of 
the firm’s purchase 
Dummy variable (=1 if yes) 
0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
SIZE* Logarithm of number of employees (Continuous variable) 4.68 1.31 3.00 11.62 
CAPITAL** 
Logarithm of capital per employee 
(Continuous variable) 
3.29 1.51 -2.35 10.14 
LABELLING* 
Since 2003, under customer policy firm 
uses labeling goods and services with 
certain clients 
Dummy variable (=1 if yes) 
0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
FIXED DEADLINES* 
Since 2003, under customer policy firm 
uses contract to assure delivery timeless  
Dummy variable (=1 if yes) 
0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 
CLIENT DEPARTMENT* 
Since 2003, the firm has had external 
manager for relation with client. 
Dummy variable (=1 if yes) 
0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Source: COI-TIC survey (INSEE-CEE), EAE, 2006. 
Note: * the variables were retrieved from COI, ** the variables were retrieved from EAE. 
 
 
3.2. Econometric Strategy  
The obvious model is the ordinary least square (OLS) regression model. However this model 
requires the explanatory variables to be exogenous, while it is clear in our case that supply 
chain quality categories are not exogenous since the same unobservable and observable 
factors (e.g. size, sector of activity, firm’s strategy, etc.) may have an impact on both firm’s 
probability to choose one of quality supply chain categories and its performance. Therefore, 
the utilisation of OLS regression model would provide biased results. Thus, to address this 
problem we apply an endogenous switching regression model that permits us to control for 
the endogenous effects by simultaneously estimating the selection equation and the firm 
performance equations for two regimes: superior or inferior quality supply chain category. 
The endogenous switching model structure is defined by two states: state 1 and state 0, 
corresponding to a specific type of quality supply chain category (for instance state 1 may 
correspond to the direct complete quality supply chain and state 0 to the indirect quality 
supply chain). 
Hence, the model is composed of the following system of three equations that are estimated 
simultaneously: 
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( ) 1  ’                                                                                                1i 1 i ilog y  X= β + ε    (1) 
( )0 0’i i oilog y  X= β + ε           (2) 
* ’ 0  i i i iISO M Z  = γ + + µ >          (3) 
 
Equations (1) and (2) are the structural equations that describe the firm performance in the 
alternative regimes. More precisely, as we have defined previously, y1i and y0i represent the 
performance of firm i in state 1 and state 0, respectively. Furthermore, Xi is a vector of 
explanatory variables (features of the firm’s strategy, external market constraints, previous 
experience with related management practices, relations with clients, logarithm of the capital 
per employee, size and sector of activity), β’1 and β’0 are vectors of the slope coefficients to 
be estimated. Finally ε1 and ε0 are the disturbance terms for the two equations with null 
means and variances equal to σ12 and σ02, respectively.  
Equation (3) is the selection equation that determines a firm’s “propensity” of belonging in 
one of the quality supply chain categories that depends on the differences between the 
economic gains associated with each category. More precisely, ISO*i is the economic gain to 
firm i for belonging to one of the quality supply chain categories, and firm i will choose one 
of the categories if its economic gain from belonging to this category is strictly positive. In 
equation (3), Mi is a vector of explanatory factors for being in one of the quality supply chain 
categories, and µ is an error term that follows a normal rule, with mean and variance equal to 
0 and 1, respectively.  
Here ISO*i is a latent variable measuring the firm’s likelihood of being in the first or the 
second regime and has the following form: 
 
*1 0
0 .
i i
i
ISO if ISO
ISO otherwise
= >
=           (4) 
 
Importantly, it is well known that this type of model is sensitive to the distributional 
assumption and the specification of both the first step switching equation and the firm 
performance equations. Hence, to reduce this sensitivity, we need to have an additional 
variable that influences a firm’s choice to become a part of a specific quality supply chain 
category but does not influence firm performance (i.e. at least one variable in M that is not in 
X). To achieve this identification, we include the vector Zi: whether a firm has a full time 
quality manager or external manager for quality. The inclusion of those variables may be 
justified by the argument that an administrative unit (such as the internal and external quality 
unit) indicates a closer proximity to institutionalised norms, thus increasing the perceived 
need to comply with those norms (Beck and Walgenbach, 2003; Pekovic, 2010). 
Additionally, administrative departments (in our case internal and external quality 
departments) serve as direct channels through which new practices enter the firm from its 
institutional environment (Pekovic, 2010). Moreover, Beck and Walgenbach (2003) find that 
having a larger proportion of administrative staff, i.e. concerning the issue of quality, 
improves and promotes the possibility of implementing quality standards. Similarly, Pekovic 
(2010) finds that internal and external quality departments positively impact the adoption of 
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quality standards. Even if this is not a proper test for instrumental variable validity, it is 
worth noting that none of our proposed instrumental variables appears to be a significant 
determinant when included directly in a single equation logit model. Furthermore, to our 
knowledge, there is no empirical or theoretical evidence regarding the direct relationship 
between those variables and a firm performance.  
Finally, we observe log(y1i) if ISOi=1 and log(y0i) if ISOi=0, with ∑ as the variance-
covariance matrix, which can be written as follows: 
 
2
1 10 1
2
10 0 0
1 0 1      
       
       
   
µ
µ
µ µ
 
 σ ρ ρ
 
 ∑ = ρ σ ρ
 
 ρ ρ 
   
 
Additionally, the variance-covariance matrix ∑ can be estimated in one step. To test for 
endogeneity in the switching model, the parameters of interest are the covariances of the 
error terms of each firm performance equation with the error terms of the selection equation. 
If these covariances are different from zero, then the selection process is not exogenous, and 
the estimation of the firm performance equations by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) would 
produce inconsistent estimators of the parameters of the model. The covariance between the 
error terms of the selection equation and firm performance equations informs us about the 
adequacy of using the switching model to describe the selection process. Fundamentally, we 
have endogeneity if ρ1µ or ρ0µ are significantly different from zero, i.e. if the errors of the 
firm performance equations and the error of the choice equation are correlated. ρ10 is not 
defined because the two regimes are never observed simultaneously. 
The switching models are then based on the analysis of three variables, but each of them is 
only partly observed (Maddala, 1983). The selection variable, ISO*i, is not directly observed 
but rather only through a dummy ISOi. 
Moreover, the probability of observing y1i or y0i depends on the outcome of the selection 
variable ISOi. The expected firm performance, conditional on being in state 1, can be 
calculated as follows: 
 
1 1 1 1
( ' )  log( ) 1 '
( ' )
i
i i i
i
ME y ISO X
Mµ
φ γ
β σ ρ
γ
 = = +  Φ
       (5) 
 
In the same way, the expected firm performance, conditional on being in state 0, is given by 
 
0 0 0 0
( ' )log( ) 0 '
1 ( ' )
i
i i i
i
ME y ISO X
M
−
 = = +  −Φµ
φ γ
β σ ρ
γ       (6) 
 
The model is estimated using the Maximum Likelihood method. Although we do not observe 
the tendency of a firm being in one particular firm performance regime, we know that if 
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ISOi=1, the firm performance is determined by equation (1), and if ISOi=0, the firm 
performance is determined by equation (2).  
4. RESULTS 
The results of estimation are presented in Table 2 to Table 7. To test H1 (1a, 1b and 1c, 
respectively), we compare the predicted mean of profit obtained from the switching model4 
between: direct complete quality supply chain and direct non complete quality chain 
categories; direct complete quality supply chain and indirect quality supply chain categories; 
direct complete quality supply chain and non quality supply chain. To assess H2 (2a, 2b and 
2c, respectively), we compare the predicted mean of profit between: direct non quality 
complete supply chain and indirect quality supply chain categories; direct non complete 
quality supply chain and non quality supply chain. To check H3, we compare the predicted 
mean of profit between: indirect quality supply chain and non quality supply chain. 
From the Table 2, we may notice that the obtained results from the comparison between 
firms in the direct complete quality supply chain and the direct non complete quality supply 
chain categories indicate that being a quality certified firm and dealing with a quality 
certified firm amplifies the positive signal, while dealing with a non-certified firm when a 
firm is certified decreases the positive signal. 
Table 2. Differences of predicted profit between direct complete quality supply chain  
and direct non complete quality supply chain (H1) 
Model 1(a)  Direct complete quality supply chain 
Direct non complete quality 
supply chain 
Direct complete quality supply 
chain vs direct non complete 
quality supply chain 
 Observed Profit Predicted Profit(b) Observed Profit 
Predicted 
Profit(b) Differences of predicted Profit 
Means 1.57 1.57 1.33 1.32 0.25*** 
Source: COI-TIC 2006 survey (INSEE-CEE), EAE 2006.  
Coverage: firms with more than 10 employees in given quality supply chain categories, sample of 3,675 firms. 
Notes: (***) indicate parameter significance at 1 percent level. 
(a) In Model 1, the dummy variable is 1 if the firm is a direct complete quality supply chain and is 0 if the firm is a direct 
Non complete quality supply chain. 
(b) The predicted profit comes from the switching model. 
 
 
The results go in the same direction when we compare the firms that belong to the direct 
complete quality supply chain to the indirect quality supply chain categories (Tables 3) and 
the firms that belong to the direct complete quality supply chain to the non quality supply 
chain categories (Table 4).  
                                              
4 For parsimony, only the predicted means that come from switching model are presented. The results of the switching 
model estimation are available from the authors upon request. It is noteworthy that generally the obtained findings tell us 
that there is evidence of endogeneity. Thus, we may conclude that our econometric model is appropriate. 
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Table 3. Differences of predicted profit between direct complete quality supply chain  
and indirect quality supply chain (H2) 
Model 2 (a) Direct complete quality supply chain Indirect quality supply chain 
Direct complete quality supply 
chain vs indirect quality supply 
chain 
 Observed Profit 
Predicted 
Profit(b) 
Observed 
Profit 
Predicted 
Profit(b) Differences of predicted Profit 
Means 1.57 1.57 1.46 1.21 0.36*** 
Source: COI-TIC 2006 survey (INSEE-CEE), EAE 2006.  
Coverage: firms with more than 10 employees in given quality supply chain categories, sample of 4,422 firms. 
Notes: (***) indicate parameter significance at 1 percent level. 
(a) In Model 1, the dummy variable is 1 if the firm is a direct complete quality supply chain and is 0 if the firm is a direct 
non complete quality supply chain. 
(b) The predicted profit comes from the switching model. 
 
Table 4. Differences of predicted profit between direct complete quality supply chain  
and non quality supply chain (H3) 
Model 3 (a) Direct complete quality supply chain Non quality supply chain 
Direct complete quality supply chain 
vs non quality supply chain 
 Observed Profit Predicted Profit(b) Observed Profit 
Predicted 
Profit(b) Differences of predicted Profit 
Means 1.57 1.57 1.29 1.16 0.41*** 
Source: COI-TIC 2006 survey (INSEE-CEE), EAE 2006.  
Coverage: firms with more than 10 employees in given quality supply chain categories, sample of 4,916 firms. 
Notes: (***) indicate parameter significance at 1 percent level. 
(a) In Model 1, the dummy variable is 1 if the firm is a direct complete quality supply chain and is 0 if the firm is a direct 
non complete quality supply chain. 
(b) The predicted profit comes from the switching model. 
 
Ultimately, we may conclude that firms belonging to the direct complete quality supply chain 
category have 25 points higher profit compared to the firms that belong to the direct non 
complete quality supply chain category, 36 points compared to the firms that belong to the 
indirect quality supply chain category, and 41 points compared to the firms that belong to the 
non quality supply chain category. A p-value of .01 indicates that the predicted mean of 
profit of firms that belongs to direct complete quality supply chain category is superior than 
those of the firms belonging to the direct non complete quality supply chain, which are 
higher than those of the firms belonging to the indirect quality supply chain, which are higher 
than those of the firms belonging to the non quality supply chain. Hence being a certified 
firm while having certified suppliers allows for the greatest impact on firm performance. 
Therefore, this confirms our first hypothesis (H1a, H1b and H1c) and shows that firms that 
belong to the direct complete quality supply chain category are leaders in the quality supply 
chain hierarchy concerning firm performance improvement. Moreover, our results confirm 
those from previous studies (e.g. Tan et al., 1998; Romano, 2002; Kuei et al., 2001; Lin et 
al., 2005; Kannan and Tan, 2005; Kaynak and Hartley, 2008; Yeung, 2008) suggesting that 
having an effective QM system in a supply chain network is essential for firm performance 
improvement. Therefore, we argue that in order to compete successfully on the market and 
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achieve firm performance improvement, managers should extend their strategies beyond their 
own firms and into the supply chain. Additionally, in line with Flynn and Flynn (2005), our 
results suggest that firms aiming to improve business performance must move supplier 
selection to a quality-based perspective. 
Table 5. Differences of predicted profit between direct non complete quality supply chain  
and indirect quality supply chain (H4) 
Model 4 (a) Direct non complete quality 
supply chain 
Indirect quality supply chain Direct non complete quality supply 
chain vs indirect quality supply 
chain 
 Observed Profit Predicted Profit(b) Observed Profit 
Predicted 
Profit(b) Differences of predicted Profit 
Means 1.33 1.33 1.46 0.42 0.91*** 
Source: COI-TIC 2006 survey (INSEE-CEE), EAE 2006. 
Coverage: firms with more than 10 employees in given quality supply chain categories, sample of 2,769 firms. 
Notes: (***) indicate parameter significance at 1 percent level. 
(a) In Model 1, the dummy variable is 1 if the firm is a direct complete quality supply chain and is 0 if the firm is a direct 
non complete quality supply chain. 
(b) The predicted profit comes from the switching model. 
 
Table 6. Differences of predicted profit between direct non complete quality supply chain  
and non quality supply chain (H5) 
Model 5 
(a) 
Direct non complete quality 
supply chain 
Non quality supply chain Direct non complete quality supply 
chain vs non quality supply chain 
 Observed Profit 
Predicted 
Profit(b) 
Observed 
Profit 
Predicted 
Profit(b) Differences of predicted Profit 
Means 1.33 1.33 1.29 0.85 0.48*** 
Source: COI-TIC 2006 survey (INSEE-CEE), EAE 2006.  
Coverage: firms with more than 10 employees in given quality supply chain categories, sample of 3,263 firms. 
Notes: (***) indicate parameter significance at 1 percent level. 
(a) In Model 1, the dummy variable is 1 if the firm is a direct complete quality supply chain and is 0 if the firm is a direct 
non complete quality supply chain. 
(b) The predicted profit comes from the switching model. 
 
Moreover, the results show that the firms in the direct non complete quality supply chain 
category are in a more profitable position compared to the firms in the indirect quality supply 
chain (Table 5) or non quality supply chain categories (Table 6). More precisely, the results 
suggest that firms that belong to the direct non complete quality supply chain category also 
have 91 points and 48 points higher profit than firms that belong to the indirect quality 
supply chain and non quality supply chain categories, respectively. Important to underline 
that two predicted differences of the means of profit are significant (p < .01). Hence, even 
though the suppliers of the direct non complete quality supply chain category are not 
certified, the firms’ direct certification is “strong” enough to have a superior impact on firm 
performance compared to the firms in the indirect quality supply chain and the non quality 
supply chain categories. Hence, our results confirm the second hypothesis (H2a and H2b) 
and situate the direct non complete quality supply chain on the second position inside the 
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quality supply chain hierarchy after the direct complete quality supply chain. Our findings 
are consistent with other studies that support the view that quality standards are based on the 
resource productivity concept, which leads to improved firm performance (Terziovski et al., 
2003; Sharma, 2005; Naveh and Marcus, 2005; Corbett et al., 2005; Terlaak and King, 2006; 
Benner and Veloso, 2008; Lo et al., 2008; Levine and Toffel, 2009). Indeed, the adoption of 
QM may be considered as a ‘win-win strategy’, not only because it is a powerful tool for 
quality improvement, but also because it can be a source of performance improvement. 
However, the results confirm previous findings which indicate that the negative effect 
(having no certified supplier) of a partnership dominates the positive effect (being certified) 
on the firm performance (e.g. Costa and Vasconcelos, 2010). Similarly, if we consider the 
category of the direct non complete quality supply chain as the pattern of supply chain 
glitches (when compared to direct complete quality supply chain), our results confirm 
previous findings that the mismatch between firm and supplier influence negatively firms 
performance (e.g. Hendricks and Singhal, 2005a; Hendricks and Singhal, 2005b). 
Table 7. Differences of predicted Profit between indirect quality supply chain  
and non quality supply chain (H6) 
Model 6(a) Indirect complete quality supply chain Non quality supply chain 
Indirect quality supply chain vs non 
quality supply chain 
 Observed Profit Predicted Profit(b) Observed Profit 
Predicted 
Profit(b) Differences of predicted Profit 
Means 1.46 1.46 1.29 1.08 0.38*** 
Source: COI-TIC 2006 survey (INSEE-CEE), EAE 2006.  
Coverage: firms with more than 10 employees in given quality supply chain categories, sample of 4,010 firms. 
Notes: (***) indicate parameter significance at 1 percent level. 
(a) In Model 1, the dummy variable is 1 if the firm is a direct complete quality supply chain and is 0 if the firm is a direct 
non complete quality supply chain. 
(b) The predicted profit comes from the switching model. 
 
Table 7 offers the results relating the differences of predicted mean of profit obtained from 
the switching between indirect quality supply chain and non quality supply chain. The 
findings associated with the third hypothesis indicate that the indirect quality supply chain 
category can indirectly profit from quality standards (via suppliers), which makes them 
different from the firms belonging to the non quality supply chain category. In fact, being a 
part of the indirect quality supply chain category is positively associated with 38 points 
improvement (p < .01) in profit compared to the firms in the non quality supply chain 
category. Consequently, the third hypothesis is supported by our results and firms in the 
indirect quality supply chain category are placed on the third position inside the quality 
supply chain hierarchy. As firms in the non quality supply chain category do not receive a 
quality signal, directly or indirectly, they are situated on the last position in the quality supply 
chain hierarchy. Therefore, our findings are in line with those from Pekovic and Galia 
(2009), who find that indirect quality certification via suppliers does matter for firm 
performance improvement. Additionally, the results support the assumption that quality 
information sharing between firm and supplier is beneficial not only for supply chain 
performance but also for firm individual performance (Wu et al., 2012). 
Based on the obtained results, we may conclude that there is a positive relationship between 
the position of the quality supply chain categories inside the quality hierarchy and the impact 
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on firm performance. Hence, the performance of firms belonging to the direct complete 
quality supply chain is higher than that of firms belonging to the direct non complete quality 
supply chain, which is higher than that of firms belonging to the indirect quality supply 
chain, which is higher than that of firms belonging to the non quality supply chain. In other 
words, these findings suggest that being a certified firm amplifies the positive effect on the 
profit of firms. Thus, we may suggest that having multiple quality affiliations improves 
firms’ performance more significantly than having only one affiliation. From a theoretical 
perspective, our findings underline the importance of the supply chain in the process of 
performance improvement. Participating in a quality supply chain offers opportunities and 
creates the skills necessary for better performance. Having multiple ties generates large 
amounts of information, including new information that competitors may not possess 
(Podolny and Baron, 1997). In fact, our empirical analysis shows that the performance of a 
firm depends on the performance of other firms upstream in its supply chain. In addition, a 
non-certified firm dealing with certified suppliers (indirect quality supply chain) can also 
improve its performance. In this sense, the results of this supply chain analysis confirm 
empirically that quality standards could be conceptualised as club goods5. We note that the 
similarity of the results to Roman (2003) supports the temporal validity of our results. Even 
though we use a database which covers only 2006, we expect analogous results in the future, 
since the establishment of quality supply chain, over time, could promote some learning 
which could, in turn, generate even better improvements in firm corporate performance. 
The differences between the findings from an OLS regression (Appendix 2) with the 
switching model findings could be partly due to an endogeneity bias. This is especially the 
case for the results concerning the direct non complete quality supply chain. Actually, the 
OLS results indicate that being a part of direct non complete quality supply chain does not 
influence a firm’s profit, while results from switching model reveal that those firms report 
higher profit. Moreover, the switching model produces higher estimates than the parameter 
estimate from the OLS regression model. These results suggest that a firm’s decision to 
choose one of the Quality Supply Chain categories is not random and depends on the firm’s 
characteristics, which indicates, at least to some extent, the relevance of using a switching 
model. 
CONCLUSION 
Rather than simply investigating whether quality certification positively or negatively 
impacts firm performance, this paper attempts to extend previous research by providing an 
empirical answer to the question of whether there is a positive correlation between the 
hierarchical positions of the quality supply chain categories and the impact on a firm 
performance. In other words, the goal of this study is to analyse whether firm corporate 
performance is conditioned on the quality level of the supply chain, focusing on the firm and 
its upstream side supply chain. Following previous scholars (Forker et al., 1997; Tan et al., 
1999; Romano and Vinelli, 2001; Romano, 2002; Wu et al., 2011), we argue that both the 
firm’s and supplier’s quality systems are determinant for the firm’s final success. 
                                              
5 In order to check the consistency of our results, we use added value as additional indicator of firm performance. The 
obtained results are going in the same direction as using profit as indicator of firm performance. The results are available 
from the authors upon request. 
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Because our focus is on an analysis with respect to quality supply chains, where members of 
supply chains are integrated based on the best strategic solutions, we have assembled datasets 
that aggregate different characteristics and strategies of firms and indicators of performance. 
We find that the performance of firms belonging to the direct complete quality supply chain 
is higher than that of firms belonging to the direct non complete quality supply chain, which 
is higher than that of the firms belonging to the indirect quality supply chain, which is higher 
than that of the firms belonging to the non quality supply chain what confirms the first 
hypothesis. The second hypothesis is also supported indicating that the performance of the 
firms belonging to the direct non complete quality supply chain is higher than that of the 
firms belonging to the indirect quality supply chain, which is higher than that of the firms 
belonging to the non quality supply chain. The results confirm the third hypothesis stating 
that the performance of the firms belonging to the indirect quality supply chain is higher than 
that of the firms belonging to the non quality supply chain. Finally, our findings demonstrate 
that there is a positive and significant relationship between the hierarchical position of the 
quality supply chain categories and the impact on firm performance. Therefore, we support 
the view that the adoption of quality standards produces positive interactions between the 
firm and its suppliers which could be reflected in various firms’ outcomes such as decreased 
production lead times, reduced costs, faster product development, and increased quality (e.g. 
Foster and Ogden, 2008). These results are also consistent with the previous research 
underlining the importance of integrating quality management in supply chains in order to 
improve firm performance (e.g. Tan et al., 1998, Romano, 2002; Kuei et al. 2001; Lin et al. 
2005; Kannan and Tan 2005; Kaynak and Hartley, 2008; Yeung 2008). Hence, we argue that 
firms could gain competitive advantage by creating more quality relationships with their 
suppliers. Additional contribution of this paper is the provision, through supply chain 
analysis, of empirical evidence demonstrating that quality standards can be viewed as club 
goods. 
Managerial Implications 
Our study has two important implications for practitioners. First, policymakers should 
emphasise the benefits of quality supply chain in order to encourage managers to adopt 
quality standards and select only quality sensitive suppliers for their firms. Managers should 
pay attention not only to their own quality, but also to the quality of their suppliers, in order 
to obtain important improvements in firm corporate performance. Moreover, the evidence we 
have accumulated indicates that adopting quality standards does not per se raise performance 
to the same degree as where firms deal with suppliers that are also quality certified. It is this 
combination that seems to matter most for firm performance. Secondly, firms without quality 
standards can deal with quality certified suppliers in order to benefit from their experience 
and in this way improve their own corporate performance. We show that firms that are not 
quality certified will, if they have quality certified firms as suppliers, benefit from this 
partnership, generating a positive signal on the market through their certified suppliers. 
Hence, cooperation among firms and suppliers permits firms in the indirect quality supply 
chain category to benefit from supplier knowledge and experience of quality, and therefore 
improve their performance compared to firms in the non quality supply chain category. This 
shows that a key objective for these firms is to establish good relationships with suppliers to 
assure continuous improvement of their performance. We may conclude that strong 
relationships with suppliers will lead to faster development and performance improvements. 
The contribution could be especially significant for managers of small firms since the quality 
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certification process is costly for them (Pekovic and Galia, 2009). Nevertheless, managers 
ought to understand that a well-established internal quality management system is necessary 
to maximise corporate performance improvement. Moreover, in order to compete 
successfully on the market, managers should extend their vision of quality beyond their own 
firms and into the upstream supply chain firms. 
Future directions for research 
This study is subject to a number of limitations and some of them are natural avenues for 
future research. Firstly, as we have already indicated, due to data limitation we were not able 
to integrate into our analysis the quality sensitivity of the downstream players of the supply 
chain. The subject is of a great importance since supply chain management requires the 
simultaneous integration of customer requirements, internal processes, and upstream supplier 
performance (Romano, 2002). Moreover, by integrating downstream players we could obtain 
a more “complete” picture of the relationship between quality sensitivity of supply chain 
players and firm corporate performance. Secondly, as our analysis is based on the French 
context, research on this issue should be extended to an international setting because the 
implementation of management practices also depends on a country’s institutional 
framework (Pekovic, 2010). Thirdly, to better generalise our conclusion supporting a positive 
correlation between the hierarchical positioning of the quality supply chain categories and the 
impact on firm performance, it would also be interesting to examine additional indicators of 
firm performance other than profit. The choice of performance measures matters because 
they mediate the relationship between the firm’s probability of choosing to join particular 
quality categories of supply chain and firm performance. Finally, this paper asks an 
important theoretical question as to whether the number of firms that are quality certified is 
Pareto optimal. This question is not trivial. At first glance, because of external factors, the 
answer could be negative (i.e. the number of firms that are quality certified is lower than the 
Pareto optimal number of quality certified firms). However, as there is no ‘poaching effect’ 
(i.e. the firms that are not quality certified also have to pay an additional cost to have quality 
certified suppliers), the firms that are not quality certified have in some way directly 
internalised the external effects in their behaviour. Another avenue of research is to 
understand why firms in the direct non complete quality supply chain category choose to 
have suppliers that are not certified when such a partnership significantly damages their 
performance.  
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Appendix 1. Pearson correlation coefficients (As for Tables 1, we do not report results concerning the variable ACTIVITY) 
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PROFIT 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
DIRECT COMPLETE QUALITY 
SUPPLY CHAIN 
0.08 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
DIRECT NON COMPLETE 
QUALITY SUPPLY CHAIN 
-0.03 
-0.28 1.00 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
IDIRECT QUALITY SUPPLY  
CHAIN 
0.11 -0.40 -0.21 1.00 - - - - - - - -         
NON QUALITY SUPPLY CHAIN -0.07 -0.47 -0.25 -0.35 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
QUALDEP 0.09 
0.26 0.01 -0.05 -0.23 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
QUALEXT 0.07 
0.20 0.01 
-0.03 -0.19 0.40 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
ES 0.07 0.30 0.03 -0.14 -0.20 0.13 0.13 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.02 -0.10 0.08 0.06 0.01 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - - 
COST REDUCTION 0.00 0.11 -0.01 0.01 -0.12 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.14 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - 
COMPETITIVE PRICE -0.06 0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.24 0.24 1.00 - - - - - - - - - 
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE -0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.09 1.00 - - - - - - - - 
MARKET UNCERTAINTY -0.08 0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.27 1.00 - - - - - - - 
CLIENTS CONDITIONED -0.03 0.16 -0.03 -0.03 -0.12 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 1.00 - - - - - - 
SUPPLIERS CONDITIONED -0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.07 -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 1.00 - - - - - 
SIZE 0.10 0.29 0.04 -0.10 -0.25 0.33 0.22 0.24 0.05 0.14 0.14 -0.02 0.01 -0.00 -0.18 1.00 - - - - 
CAPITAL 0.38 0.14 -0.02 -0.02 -0.12 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.02 0.07 0.07 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.05 0.17 1.00 - - - 
LABELLING 0.02 0.34 0.13 -0.16 -0.30 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.05 0.06 0.06 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.19 0.05 1.00 - - 
FIXED DEADLINES 0.04 0.29 0.03 -0.05 -0.28 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.27 1.00 - 
EXTERNAL MANAGERS FOR 
RELATION WITH CLIENT  
0.10 0.07 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 0.22 0.32 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02 -0.09 -0.02 0.22 0.11 0.07 0.06 1.00 
Source: COI-TIC 2006 survey (INSEE-CEE), EAE 2006. 
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Appendix 2. The relation between Quality Supply Chains  
and firms’ performance (Ordinary Least Square) 
 PROFIT 
DIRECT COMPLETE QUALITY 
SUPPLY CHAIN 0.13*** 
 (3.00) 
DIRECT NON COMPLETE 
QUALITY SUPPLY CHAIN -0.01 
 (0.28) 
INDIRECT  QUALITY SUPPLY 
CHAIN 0.11*** 
 (2.69) 
NON QUALITY SUPPLY CHAIN Ref. 
  
ES 0.00 
 (0.10) 
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 0.17*** 
 (2.19) 
COST REDUCTION -0.02 
 (0.59) 
COMPETITIVE PRICE -0.25*** 
 (5.97) 
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE -0.05 
 (1.65) 
MARKET UNCERTAINTY -0.18*** 
 (6.10) 
CLIENTS CONDITIONED -0.11*** 
 (3.57) 
SUPPLIERS CONDITIONED 0.01 
 (0.38) 
SIZE 0.34*** 
 (31.27) 
CAPITAL 0.00 
 (0.34) 
LABELLING -0.05* 
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 (1.67) 
FIXED DEADLINES 0.13*** 
 (4.18) 
CLIENT DEPARTMENT 0.13*** 
 (3.63) 
AGRIFOOD -0.25*** 
 (3.45) 
CONSUMPTION GOODS 0.11 
 (1.48) 
CARS AND EQUIPMENTS -0.08 
 (1.42) 
ENERGY 0.28 
 (1.65) 
INTERMEDIATE GOODS Ref. 
  
CONSTRUCTION -0.01 
 (0.22) 
COMMERCIAL 0.23*** 
 (4.04) 
TRANSPORT -0.49*** 
 (7.23) 
FINANCIAL AND REAL ESTATE -0.08 
 (0.78) 
SERVICES FOR FIRMS 0.16*** 
 (2.55) 
SERVICES FOR INDIVIDUALS -0.09 
 (1.06) 
Intercept 0.35*** 
 (3.18) 
  
R-squared 0.18 
Observations 7685 
Source: COI-TIC 2006 survey (INSEE-CEE), EAE 2006.  
Coverage: firms with more than 10 employees in given quality supply chain categories, sample of 4,010 firms. 
Notes: (*), (**) and (***) indicate parameter significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
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